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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-1642
________________
HECTOR L. HUERTAS,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; SUN BANCORP, INC.
_______________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-007955)
District Judge: Honorable Herbert J. Hutton
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 14, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed : July 19, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from the dismissal of Appellant Hector Huertas’ complaint as a
sanction for his continued failure to attend scheduled depositions. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts, thus, we will only briefly summarize them
here. On October 17, 2000, a robbery was reported at the Sun National Bank in
Philadelphia. On October 26, 2000, Huertas walked into the bank. A bank employee,
believing that Huertas fit the description of the robber, notified the Philadelphia Police.
Huertas alleges that the police responded by violently arresting him, causing permanent
injuries. On October 18, 2002, Huertas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of his civil rights by the City of Philadelphia in conspiracy with Sun Bancorp.
Huertas immediately requested that the Defendants complete hundreds of
interrogatories, and began filing numerous motions with the District Court. After a
number of filings by all parties, the District Court entered a series of orders denying
Huertas’ motions to compel discovery and to amend his complaint, as well as several
other motions seeking various other remedies. See D. Ct. Docket Nos. 40-50. During
this period, the Defendants scheduled a deposition, which Huertas failed to attend. This
process of notice and failure to attend recurred several times over the course of the next
year. On November 8, 2004, while still in the discovery phase, the Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), (d). The District
Court held that Huertas’ failure to attend multiple depositions, once in defiance of a court
order, was sufficient to warrant dismissal after conducting the six-factor inquiry
announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the dismissal of a
complaint under Rule 37 for abuse of discretion. Id. In determining whether the District
Court abused its discretion, “we will be guided by the manner in which the court balanced
the Poulis factors and whether the record supports its finding.” Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d
954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986). The factors are:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice, to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party
or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and
(6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
First, the District Court concluded that Huertas was personally responsible. The
record confirms that Huertas, who is proceeding pro se, failed to adhere to the local and
federal rules of procedure, despite the District Court’s attempts to provide guidance.
See Order, Docket No. 49, n.1; Order, Docket No. 89 n.1; Order, Docket No. 104 n.2.
Huertas argues that because he appeared for his fifth deposition on November 4, 2004, at
1:37 p.m., only four hours late, it was the Defendants’ fault for not taking his deposition
at that time. His argument is without force. He provides no reason as to why he did not
arrive at 9:30 a.m. Further, that the Defendants used email to reject Huertas’ request to
reschedule the deposition does not transfer the fault to the Defendants. If anything,
Huertas’ failure to check his email, a means of communication he clearly intended to use,
only damages his argument.
3

Next, we agree with the District Court that the Defendants suffered substantial
prejudice in scheduling and holding five depositions, all of which Huertas failed to attend.
See Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding the costs and time
associated with scheduling unattended depositions was prejudicial). Also, Huertas’
failure to appear for depositions after receiving adequate notice and his failure to pursue
any protection from the District Court establishes a pattern of dilatory conduct. See
Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863,
874-75 (3d Cir. 1994).
With respect to bad faith or willfulness, Huertas argues that his fear of heights and
back injury prevented him from attending his depositions, and that his lack of attendance
was not designed to prevent the defense from taking his deposition. It is not so clear that
Huertas’ conduct was willful as defined by this Court. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875 (“tardiness
not excused for inability is not necessarily willful.”). Huertas’ disabilities did not, as far
as we can discern, prevent him from timely filing for protective orders, nor does he
explain how his disability prevented his 9:30 a.m. appearance at his fifth deposition.
However, this does not show that Huertas’ conduct was designed to be “strategic or selfserving,” an inference usually required for a finding of willfulness. Id. With respect to
the fifth factor, alternative sanctions would likely be ineffective,1 or at least other

1

For example, even after Huertas was ordered to pay $ 200 for failure to comply
with applicable rules of procedure, no significant change was seen in his conduct.
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available sanctions would amount to what in effect would be the dismissal of the
complaint.
Finally, we agree that Huertas’ complaint asserts arguably meritorious claims.
While we continue to adhere to the principle that “doubts should be resolved in favor of
reaching a decision on the merits,” see Scarborough v. Evans, 747 F.2d 871, 878 (3d Cir.
1984), that Huertas’ conduct was not necessarily willful does not make the District
Court’s balance unreasonable. See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc. 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating “each factor need not be satisfied for the trial court to dismiss a claim”).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint. Accordingly,
we will affirm.2

2

Huertas also appeals from a number of other orders denying his various motions
to amend his complaint, compel discovery, and for either dismissal or default judgment.
Our affirmance of the District Court’s dismissal is dispositive. Accordingly, we need not
decide the propriety of these other orders.
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